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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff Alert List

- 1. A short time ago the DCI expressed interest on the impact of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) Alert List which was published on 17 July 1975. Rather than limit our review to this specific issue, we considered the effect. of the SWS Alert List in more general terms, including its relationship to the Monthly Report -- also published by the SWS.
- Concerning the question on the extent to which Alert List items are answered: we would note that the Alert List is meant to be essentially a "prodding mechanism." Formal written responses are not required, but informal reaction to the Alert List or additional information is welcome.
- the Director of SWS, believes the Alert List is doing its job satisfactorily. He singled out field responses as being most helpful, especially those from EUCOM, PACOM, US Forces Korea, Taiwan Defense Command, and Air Defense Command. He believes the Alert List has had an obvious impact on the analysts working for these commands and has definitely generated field collection requirements. (See Attachment 1 for examples of two field responses to items on the 17 July 1975 SWS Alert List). One of the reasons the field commands respond so well is that they had been in the habit of responding weekly to the old Watch Committee's preliminary agenda. one of the reasons for initiating the Alert List was to take advantage of the work cycle already followed by the various field commands to support the former Watch Committee and the National Indications Center.

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4. Among intelligence agencies in the Washington community, the situation is somewhat different. NSA has been especially helpful and cooperative in responding informally to Alert List queries, particularly those that have been earmarked for publication in the SWS Monthly Report. Chief of Intelligence Support at the National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC), stated that NSA analysts are encouraged to respond to items on the Alert List and tasked to respond to those items which will be addressed in the SWS Monthly Report. NSA analysts also take action to alert collectors if, after group discussion, satisfactory answers to Alert List questions cannot be resolved. As a result, NSA's contribution to the Alert List and the Monthly Report has been especially helpful and cooperative.

- List to the analysts but does not task its people to respond. However, analysts are encouraged to do so and, according to the Acting Chief, Indications and Warning Reconnaissance Support Branch, initiatives have begun within the last few weeks for more responsiveness to both the Alert List and Monthly Report. Up to now DIA analysts appear to have been driven by their own production requirements, although they have contributed some support on an analyst-to-analyst level with the SWS.
- Chief of Requirements Division (DC-3) stated that he and his people are aware of the Alert List but view it as somewhat historical. His people work very closely with the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) personnel and go over an alert list of their own on a daily basis. Therefore, the SWS Alert List is considered a summary of warning and indicator items rather than a list that drives collection requirements. It acts as a weekly barometer for areas of tension. Thus it is useful for those not normally involved in such activity on a daily basis as are DC and NMIC analysts.
- 7. CIA's response to the Alert List is similar to DIA's. _____, DDI/OCI Indications Officer, has indicated that the Alert List does prod CIA analysts to discuss

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certain items with SWS personnel, and formal contributions have occasionally been provided. Since no response is required, analysts do not feel compelled to submit written contributions. Analysts, however, do coordinate on the "Monthly Report" and give it more attention than the SWS Alert List. The impact of the Alert List on CIA collection, such as DDO, appears to have been minimal up to now. Steps are being taken to broaden dissemination of the Alert List, and this may improve the situation.

- State/INR analysts are aware of the Alert List but do not contribute directly. On occasion, views are exchanged with or members of his staff. According to Mr. Robert Baraz, Director, Office of Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces, State/INR views the SWS Alert List as a preview of things that the people in the field are looking for. State/INR analysts use the Alert List as it may or may not apply in their own research and production requirements. The SWS Monthly Report is considered a SWS function, and State/INR contributes little in the way of suggestions. However, the Monthly Report serves as a focal point for analysts working the problem. and State/INR analysts do coordinate on the draft. However, State's contribution seems to be, at best, "light coordination."
- 9. As for the Services, only US Air Force intelligence has been helpful in researching certain topics. Army and Navy intelligence analysts have not contributed but have been cooperative when the SWS has gone to them with specific queries.
- 10. One potential problem seems to be distribution of the Alert List and Monthly Report. Although the SWS does its job of getting the copies to the different agencies and offices, it is less clear that these recipients get the publications out to all that may have an interest, particularly the collectors. CIA is now taking action to realign and expand distribution of the Alert List to include DDO desks covering areas such as the PRC, USSR, and Korea. DIA's distribution is satisfactory except that the Deputy Director for Attaches and Human Resources is not on the distribution list for either the Alert List or the Monthly Report. Since attaches are important intelligence collectors, it would seem appropriate that at least the division chiefs

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in this Directorate should see each publication. Steps are now being taken by the SWS to insure distribution to this Directorate.

- 11. We found that the majority of topics suggested in the 17 July 1975 Alert List were addressed in the 24 July 1975 Monthly Report (Attachment 2). Of those not covered, contributions were received from field commands and either the data were superseded by events or the SWS is holding the intelligence for further analysis. For example, one item in the 17 July Alert List concerned Chinese Navy developments during the past several years. Response was good, but the SWS is researching the topic further before publishing its findings.
- In general, we found that the Alert List does have an impact on analysts -- more so in the field commands than the Washington community. We have found the impact to be somewhat less on collectors. NSA and the field commands have been especially responsive and helpful to the SWS. CIA, DIA, and Air Force have also been supportive while State/INR, Army, and Navy have limited their response to support when asked. To facilitate support to the SWS, CIA has requested that the name and phone number of the SWS analyst appear with each item in the Alert List. This has been done, beginning with the 31 July Alert List. Also, in the interest of improving support to the SWS mission, distribution of the two publications within CIA and DIA is being expanded. The IC Staff survey also has generated renewed interest in the subject documents, and we expect some increase in the use and support of both the Alert List and Monthly Report.

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Attachments

1. Field Responses to SWS Alert List

2. SWS Monthly Report, 24 July 1975

Distribution:

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3 - IC Registry

4 - Area Br. Subject

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